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“You cannot respond to offensive speech with violence without
begetting more violence.”1
- Hillary Rodham Clinton
1.

INTRODUCTION

American intervention in the “Muslim World”2 during the past
several years has by no means been non-controversial; rather,
† Arab Spring demonstrators have described their protests as Days of Rage.
See Middle East Protests: Inside The Arab Youth Quake, Huffington Post (February
17, 2011).
* Visiting Professor of Law, Saint George’s University; Adjunct Professor,
New York Law School. J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School; A.B., Cornell
University. This Article sets the background for my manuscript, “Jus Ad Bellum:
International Law or Outlaw?” I would like to thank my family for their
unbounded love and devotion.
1 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at
Reception Marking Eid ul-Fitr (Sept. 13, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/09/197735.htm).
2 For an attempt to define this term, see Is There A ‘Muslim World’?, NPR
(June 4, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=104927939 (questioning whether the Muslim World “exists as an
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critics often charge that we alternatively violate international law
or selectively use its protective cloak to advance our own interests.3
Viewed through this lens, American pronouncements might
understandably be received as edicts encroaching upon local
autonomy and reminiscent of colonial days. Still, the unfolding
acts of violence against Americans and Western embassies in the
“Muslim World” following the online posting of a U.S.-made
“Mohammad video”4 were not foreseen.5 If they had been, we can
international community or just a piece of political rhetoric”). See also Ramzy
Baroud, The Myth of a ‘Muslim World,’ ASIA TIMES ONLINE (June 2, 2009),
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF02Ak04.html
(describing
America’s “grave concern” with moqawama (or local resistance), including homegrown pro-democracy movements, as one reason for its continued and
predictable failings in the Middle East).
3 Among the most cited examples, George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 on
the basis of undisclosed evidence indicating that weapons of mass destruction
(“WMD”) existed and were to be used imminently against American interests. See
Harry Van der Linden, Would the United States Doctrine of Preventive War Be
Justified as a United Nations Doctrine?, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE “WAR
ON TERRORISM” 141 (Gail M. Presbey ed., 2007) (criticizing the George W. Bush
doctrine of preventive war and the National Security Strategy’s (“NSS”)
September 2002 argument justifying unilateral American military action even in
the face of uncertainty as to the time and place of an enemy’s attack). See also,
Matthew C. Waxman, The Use of Force Against States That Might Have Weapons of
Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2009) (describing the limits of both
collective United Nations action and the unilateral doctrine of anticipatory selfdefense, and arguing in favor of an objective necessity approach as a limited
exception to United Nations action especially useful in the face of perceived WMD
threat scenarios). Separately, his father George H.W. Bush has been criticized for
selectively seizing upon United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 to
“liberate” the people of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation while also protecting
American oil interests.
4 See ninjord, Innocence of Muslims (The Muhammad Movie) by Sam Bacile,
YOUTUBE
(Sept.
16,
2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
X6s8eFkt90Q&bpctr=1365390849.
5 Four Americans were killed in response to the video, including the U.S.
Ambassador Christopher Stevens, during an attack on the American consulate in
Benghazi, Libya. Meanwhile, protesters in Cairo attacked the U.S. embassy there
and demanded that the U.S. Ambassador be expelled. An American school in
Tunisia was ransacked, and the State Department reportedly evacuated families
and nonessential personnel from U.S. embassies in Tunis and Khartoum. See
Andrew Roche, Fury over Mohammad Video Simmers on in Muslim World, REUTERS
(Sept. 16, 2012, 4:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/16/us-filmprotests-idUSBRE88D0O320120916; Peter Baker & Mark Landler, U.S. Is Preparing
for a Long Siege of Arab Unrest, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/world/middleeast/us-is-preparing-for-
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assume, and hope, that the relevant embassies would have recalled
or at least reduced their staffs, especially as violence in the region
is not a new phenomenon.6 However, these unfortunate events
present us with an opportunity to query whether these attacks
were foreseeable, and to review the psychology behind our being
caught off guard.
This solemn occasion perhaps reflects a warped understanding
of our hosts’ cultural sensitivities, or even our limited genuine
interest in what concerns them at all. We are led to question the
ability and willingness of American policy-makers to consider, and
thereby respect, local priorities. Insofar as Islam permeates the
culture of many of these host nations and our foreign policy
priorities reflect our willingness to accommodate this permeation,
a question arises as to whether this foreign policy is so decidedly
grounded in values antagonistic to Islam. To further emphasize
the pressure of this situation, the present conundrum
coincidentally presents “Mr. Obama’s most serious foreign policy
crisis of the election season.”7
In order to strike a respectful balance among nations’
competing interests, customary international law provides
standards that all states must respect in order to maintain peace
and stability. Additionally, all members of the United Nations
must adhere to the tenets of its Charter including principles
a-long-siege-of-arab-unrest.html?pagewanted=all.
Additionally, protesters
climbed the walls of the German embassy in Khartoum and set it on fire. The
U.S., U.K., and German embassies in Sudan were stormed and set ablaze. See
Embassy Attacks a Policy Wake-up Call for US Elite, FOREIGN POL’Y J. (Sept. 15, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/09/15/embassy-attacks-a-policywake-up-call-for-us-elite (posting Video Interview by RT Moscow with Gareth
Porter, Investigative Journalist, in Wash. D.C. (Sept. 15, 2012)). Protesters also
broke into the U.S. embassy in Sanaa, Yemen with sounds of gunfire reported.
Blowback Time for US, Death & Disaster Only Outcome, FOREIGN POL’Y J. (Sept. 15,
2012), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/09/15/blowback-time-for-usdeath-disaster-only-outcome (posting Video Interview by RT Moscow with Neil
Clark, Journalist and Broadcaster, in Oxford, U.K. (Sept. 15, 2012)).
6 Specifically, violence during the Arab Spring is not a surprise in spite of its
peaceful connotations. Professor Hannibal Travis has even suggested that “[c]ivic
protest more often fails without international or domestic military conflict.” See
Hannibal Travis, Wargaming the ‘Arab Spring’: Predicting Likely Outcomes and
Planning U.N. Responses, (Fla. Int’l Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-07)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2062578##. According to
this perspective, we should be prepared for any and all conflagrations,
particularly on September 11.
7 Baker & Landler, supra note 5.
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relating to the use of force and the “sovereign equality of all its
Members.”8 Moreover, the community of nations continues to
have a duty to protect populations suffering from a humanitarian
disaster.9 The issue presented before us is whether we have failed
to live up to this responsibility in our dealings with the “Muslim
World.”10 Specifically, has the Obama Administration acted in
violation of international law just as its predecessors are commonly
charged to have done? Armed with this knowledge, we might
reconsider our regional security expectations.
2.

ARAB SPRING: BACKGROUND AND PERCEPTIONS

The incendiary act of posting an American-made video with
presumably American actors bastardizing the prophet Muhammad
and the tenets of Islam fanned the Arab Spring’s flames of
dissatisfaction with existing economic conditions. These flames
were quite easily redirected toward a foreign interloper that has
historically supported regional dictators.11 As most citizens in the
region grew up under autocratic regimes that exercised censorship
over all media, they are simply unaccustomed to free speech. State
sponsorship of the video by the U.S. government is therefore
presumed.12 The result of this is the current “Autumnal Rage”13

U.N. Charter art. 2(1).
See infra Section 3.2.
10 See Is There A ‘Muslim World’?, supra note 2; Baroud, supra note 2.
11 See Baker & Landler, supra note 5 (“Mr. Obama’s defenders argue that the
legacy of American support for Arab autocrats complicated the situation. . . .
‘[W]e had a good 40 years of U.S. policy backing regimes that the people in the
street overthrew.’”) (quoting Martin S. Indyk, former ambassador to Israel under
President Clinton).
12 See Ed Husain, Arab Spring Nations Don’t Yet Grasp Freedom of Dissent,
CNNOPINION (Sept. 14, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/
09/14/opinion/husain-arab-spring-democracy/index.html (indicating that many
in the Muslim world were raised under dictatorial regimes, have inculcated the
impression that a film cannot be produced without government approval, and
thus attribute the “Mohammed video” to the U.S. government).
13 See Andrew Lam, From Arab Spring to Autumn Rage: The Dark Power of Social
Media, in THE BLOG, HUFFPOST WORLD (Sept. 14, 2012, 3:44 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-lam/social-media-middle-eastprotests-_b_1881827.html (discussing the role played by social media in “stoking a
combustible anger in the Middle East” resulting in the anti-American violence
and protests of fall 2012). I respectfully adapt Lam’s term, “Autumn Rage.”
8
9
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that we must bear, even in spite of official State Department
disavowal and suggestions for restraint.14
2.1. Origin and Symptoms
The origins of the Arab Spring are debatable, but protests
throughout the “Muslim World” were precipitated by varying
reports of declining economic conditions, human rights abuses,
and improved education that might have encouraged youth
dissatisfaction with autocrats. That a wave of protests spread
across these nations is not new; in fact, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya
all witnessed similar waves of protest following President
Woodrow Wilson’s call to democracy almost a century ago in 1919.
Then as now, the open question is why the passions of protest
were aroused in the first place.15
Specific conditions were necessary for these revolutions against
authority to actually succeed.16 Where they did, the supposed
political freedoms realized by the Arab Spring have not yet
translated into economic benefits for local populations, so that we
are witnessing an accumulated venting of frustrations.17 One
complicating factor has been that, as regional authoritarian
governments were removed, extremist Islamic governments took
their places.18
To make matters worse, these successor
14 See Clinton, supra note 1 (“[T]he United States rejects both the content and
the message of that video. The United States deplores any intentional effort to
denigrate the religious beliefs of others.”).
15 The precedent of the 1919 protests leads us to question the popular claim
that the Arab Spring was facilitated by the advent of social media. See Lisa
Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia,
Egypt, and Libya, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2011, at 2, 2 (noting that telegraphs and
not social media were used to incite the 1919 protests).
16 Jack Goldstone identifies the following elements: 1) the government is
viewed as so irremediably unjust or inept that it appears as a threat to the
country’s future; 2) elites are alienated from the state and unwilling to defend it;
3) a broad cross-section of the population is mobilized; and 4) international
powers fail to defend the government and prevent it from using full force to
defend itself. See Jack A. Goldstone, Understanding the Revolutions of 2011:
Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2011,
at 8, 16.
17 See Maha Hosain Aziz, End of the Arab Spring?, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-19/end-of-thearab-spring (arguing that the Arab Spring has not yet culminated in economic
opportunities, and that food price inflation, which, among other factors,
prompted the Arab Spring in 2011, is likely to prompt further protests).
18 See, e.g., Baker & Landler, supra note 5 (“[The Obama] administration has
struggled to find a balance between supporting democracy and guarding national
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governments have failed to grasp that true democracy is “not only
about free elections but creating free societies.”19
Following the posting of the “Mohammad video” by an
Egyptian Coptic Christian,20 the lingering unrest brought on
during the 2011 Arab Spring demonstrations was violently
redirected against Western nations.
Popular resentment of
repressive regional governments—the principal object of the Arab
Spring—has been successfully unleashed upon Western interests.
Was this simply a natural occurrence?
To the contrary, Islamic extremist groups like al-Qaeda have
found themselves increasingly vulnerable after the death of Osama
bin Laden and in the wake of the Arab Spring’s call for democratic
reforms. Out of desperation, these groups have seized on a
campaign of misinformation to regenerate and to recruit money
and manpower.21 Reportedly, they have attempted to exploit this
situation by encouraging even more attacks on American
embassies throughout the region.22 Regional governments have
also stirred the pot by issuing bounties for the killing of the “antiMuhammad” video’s producer.23
interests in the region as authoritarian governments have been replaced by
popular Islamist parties much less tied to Washington.”). In Libya, for example,
Western and Arab support for the Libyan National Transitional Council
(“LNTC”) enabled it to oust Qaddafi; the LNTC has since instituted Sharia Law as
the basis for legislation, thereby proscribing any contravening measures. In Iraq,
sectarian tensions continue with the Shi’ite Kurd population targeted by the Sunni
government. After Egypt’s peaceful transition, Prime Minister Hisham Qandil’s
cabinet was composed primarily of Muslim Brotherhood members.
19 Husain, supra note 12.
20 The filmmaker, Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, apparently holds grudges
against Islam. See Lam, supra note 13 (“[Nakoula] fanned the fire in the Middle
East with incendiary video clips that in effect mocked and insulted the prophet
Mohammed and turned the whole Arab Spring of 2011 into Autumn Rage of 2012
Against the USA.”).
21 Ali Soufan, an expert on the Middle East, argues that radical entities in
Arab Spring countries have used the ‘anti–Muhammad video’ to strengthen their
anti-American campaigns. See Islamist Extremism After the Arab Spring, COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/middleeast/islamist-extremism-after-arab-spring/p29053 (transcribing Interview by
Jonathan Masters with Ali Soufan, CEO, The Soufan Group (Sept. 14, 2012)).
22 See Husain, supra note 12 (“The attacks on the American embassies in
Libya, Egypt and Yemen are examples of the ongoing presence of intolerant,
tyrannical actors in Arab societies.”).
23 A Pakistani cabinet minister and a former Pakistani legislator issued
bounties for $100,000 and $200,000 respectively. See Riaz Khan, ‘Innocence Of
Muslims’ Protests: $200,000 Bounty Offered In Pakistan For Anti–Islam Filmmaker’s
Death,
HUFFPOST
WORLD
(Oct.
1,
2012,
8:32
AM),
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2.2. Role of “Islamic Fire”
From a Western perspective, Islam is ordinarily viewed as only
a religion confined to its mosques, though it is often much more.
Peter Hammond captures this view in asserting that “the primary
aim of Islam is not spiritual, but political,” and that Islam’s goal is
to establish a “worldwide Islamic state where Sharia law is
enforced on all.”24 Moreover, one reader of Hammond’s work
extrapolates and claims that in much of the region, where the
Islamic population is greater than eighty percent, we should
“expect daily intimidation and violent jihad, some State-run ethnic
cleansing, and even some genocide, as these nations drive out the
infidels, and move toward 100% Muslim.”25 If we believe these
predictions, then the anti-Mohammed video should be expected to
incite violent retaliatory responses; the most immediate outlet for
such violence was the Western presence on the ground in the form
of embassies and diplomatic missions.
And yet we need to be careful in assuming that this “system of
life” has taken hold consistently throughout the Arab Middle East.
Whereas the new avowedly democratic regional governments will
inevitably bring Islamist parties to the political fore, Western
governments will need to be able to deal with this reality in spite of
the new governments’ anti-Israeli stance. There is hope, as the
toppling of governments in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt occurred
without violent jihad and thus contrary to the calls for action
espoused by al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremists.26 However,
the remaining political vacuum might also pose an opportunity for
al-Qaeda to stretch its tentacles. The lesson is that the United
States and other Western powers should engage with the
successive governments to nudge them toward true democracy
and constitutional nation building.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/01/innocence-of-muslims-filmmakerbounty_n_1928565.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.
24 PETER HAMMOND, SLAVERY, TERRORISM AND ISLAM: THE HISTORICAL ROOTS
AND CONTEMPORARY THREAT 43 (2005).
Bill Muehlenberg, Dar al-Harb and Islamic Expansionism, CULTUREWATCH,
http://www.billmuehlenberg.com/2013/02/04/dar-al-harb-and-islamicexpansionism/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
26 See Daniel Byman, Terrorism After the Revolutions: How Secular Uprisings
Could Help (or Hurt) Jihadists, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2011, at 48, 49 (pointing to
the demands by protesters in Tunisia and Egypt for a free press, elections, and
civil liberties as ideas that al-Qaeda believes are “as abhorrent as secular
dictatorship”).
25
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2.3. American Perceptions
Historically, American strategic priorities have placed the
defense of the American mainland at the top; the betterment of the
American economic system, second; the containment through
military alliances of America’s main adversary, the Soviet Union,
third; and, at the bottom, the encouragement of underdeveloped
countries to grow in the image of the United States through the
transplanting of American values abroad.27
These American priorities play a key role in forming our
foreign policies, and thereby shape attitudes abroad.
The
suggestion is that the United States has pursued its own economic
interests—as in category two, above—at the same time that it has
chosen to ignore the values cherished by local populations. In
abetting and enabling regional struggles during the Arab Spring,
did the United States perpetuate a public image as an oilfieldhungry empire, or as a benefactor that facilitates democracy? Or is
this image irrelevant, in light of regional sensitivities to anti-Islam
media messages?
By contrast, it would be awkward and unrealistic to expect
American and Muslim World priorities to always align; the policies
of any two nations rarely overlap. Whereas politicians often vie
over defending American citizens’ interests, the same cannot be
said about defending the interests of foreign populations, simply
because our politicians are not directly accountable to them.
Rather, a classical realist worldview suggests that all states can be
expected to advance their own interests first and foremost, rather
than any universal moral imperative.28 This paradigm ensures that
the interests of foreign populations will tend to be secondary in
American policy-making.
Moreover, within a democracy like the United States, different
players have varying priorities. For example, President Obama
27 See Manoj Joshi, South Asia and American Strategic Policy, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICA AND SOUTH ASIA 29, 30–31 (Robert M. Crunden et al.
eds., 1984) (cataloguing American strategic priorities in global politics).
28 Specifically, classical realism considered moral theorizing around
international responsibilities as futile. See Allen Buchanan & David Golove,
Philosophy of International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 868, 872 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (arguing,
inter alia, that the realist perspective may imply alternatively (i) that moral norms
do not exist in international law; (ii) that no actor behaves or will behave morally
in international relations; or (iii) that moral conduct in international relations is
irrational and thus rare).
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might value America’s current relations with the Muslim World
differently than Governor Romney does. In an election year like
2012, we could have expected the political opposition to have a
strong influence; we could even have queried whether the antiMuhammad video, along with its timing during election season,
was a strategic ploy by the political opposition to besmirch the
President’s record in the Middle East. In any case, we could have
predicted Romney’s questioning the Obama Administration’s
actions and inactions that allowed the September 11, 2012 attack on
American interests in Benghazi.29
The anti-Islam video’s appearance in the Muslim World
presumably purports to suggest that it best reflects Western
perceptions of Islam, specifically those of the Obama
Administration. Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attempted
to pacify concerns over the video’s authorship.
However,
Secretary Clinton’s criticism of the Muslim World‘s response to the
video can also be interpreted as actually including a veiled threat:
“You cannot respond to offensive speech with violence without
begetting more violence.”30 Perhaps she was speaking figuratively,
but in the context of delivering comments at an event to mark a
Muslim holy day, her words might also be interpreted as
suggesting reprisals. In any case, ambiguous words do not
necessarily evince a clear indication of a nation’s foreign policy
intentions; by contrast, consistency with international law can be
more telling.

29 Reports indicate that the United States might have underestimated the
security situation in Benghazi. Ambassador Christopher Stevens’ diary, retrieved
by CNN, displays his growing concerns. After a roadside bombing on June 6,
2012, Representative Peter King of New York, Chairman of the House Committee
on Homeland Security, recalls nothing about requests “for more security or that
they thought they needed more because it was more of a risk, or that there was
talk or a debate about it.” See Eric Schmitt et al., U.S. May Have Put Mistaken Faith
in Libya Site’s Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/10/01/world/africa/mistaken-sense-of-security-cited-before-envoy-tolibya-died.html. However, it is really the host country’s duty to alert the embassy
about security threats, and the decision of how to respond belongs to the
Ambassador; of course, if Ambassador Stevens requested reinforcements that the
State Department denied, the criticism might be valid.
30 Clinton, supra note 1.
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RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

3.1. The Use of Force
Traditional thinking on the right of a nation to use unilateral
force against another nation is embodied in the United Nations
Charter, which only permits such acts in situations where an
armed attack has occurred.31 In the aftermath of September 11,
2001, many have called for the expansion of these circumstances on
the basis that the nature of security threats have changed, and
threats might now emerge where they would not have in the past.
Thus, the argument goes, the rules governing the use of force
should adapt in step with the times. Specifically, the doctrine of
preventive war has garnered support where a non-imminent threat
is in danger of being carried out, and where well-articulated
evidence substantially corroborates the suspicion.32 By contrast,
the classic anticipatory self-defense argument requires the threat
posed to be imminent.
Traditionalists counter that the Security Council’s decisionmaking process more adequately addresses the “new terrorism”
threats as it melds cooperation with a broader range of
circumstances in which force may be authorized.33 By way of
31 The U.N. Charter provides: “All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2(4). As
a narrow carve-out to this general prohibition, the Charter provides further:
“Nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.” U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphases added).
32 See generally Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, The “Bush Doctrine”: Can
Preventive War Be Justified?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 843, 863–65 (2009) (arguing
that the United Nations rules of force will have to be supplanted, and providing
the following criteria for an intervener to initiate a preventive war: 1) the
prospective intervener must announce to the world its intentions and give the
target nation an opportunity to peaceably provide redress; 2) it must have a
justifiable purpose of protecting an innocent civilian population; 3) it should act as
part of a coalition of forces; 4) it should have attempted acts other than the use of
force to dispel the force; and 5) the use of force employed should be proportionate
to the threat posed).
33 Article 39 requires the Security Council to “determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and . . . make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” U.N.
Charter art. 39. Article 41, in turn, empowers the Security Council to take
measures short of using force, including the disruption of economic and
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example, Professor Allen Weiner asserts that, although the
unanimity of the Security Council’s five permanent members has
in the past been considered a roadblock to authorizing the use of
force due to their conflicting alliances and stances among
themselves, the nature of the new security threats do not
predictably demonstrate such differences.34 Insofar as acts of terror
threaten the efficient channels of capitalism, the hegemony enjoyed
by the leaders of the world economies will more naturally tend to
unite them as a function of their own self-interests.35 This
sensitivity to a united call to action is especially acute in the Middle
East, where international dependence on oil imports from the
region compels world attention. This interest arises from concerns
about a consistent supply of energy commodities that can affect
national security and feed the engines of capitalism.
In response, expansionists36 point to the state of customary
international law prior to the adoption of the United Nations
Charter as permissive of self-defense “in anticipation of an

diplomatic relations. U.N. Charter art. 41. Moreover, if the Security Council
suspects that Article 41 measures would be, or have proven to be, inadequate,
then Article 42 enables it to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 42.
34 Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats: Old
Medicine for New Ills?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 415 (2006). Weiner argues that when
dealing with the increased proliferation of WMD and acts of terrorism, the
Security Council’s existing mechanism will likely be more reliable and effective
than contemporary demands for expansion of the unilateral self-defense doctrine
beyond actual armed attacks. He also points out that this possibility will not
always yield unanimous outcomes, as the split opinions in the case of Iraq
demonstrate.
35 See id. at 455.
36 See, e.g., Alexander Benard & Paul J. Leaf, Modern Threats and the United
Nations Security Council: No Time for Complacency (A Response to Professor Allen
Weiner), 62 STAN. L. REV. 1395 (2010). Benard and Leaf critique Weiner’s
contention as idealistic by offering examples of discord among the permanent
members in the cases of Iran, North Korea, and the missile defense programs in
Eastern Europe and East Asia. Id. at 1415–34. They suggest that reforms to the
international law on the use of force are the way forward, in part due to the
continued reluctance of Russia and China to abandon their Cold War-era
mentality of “spheres of influence.” Id. at 1433. Due to the modern armed
terrorist’s ability to strike without warning or concern of a retaliatory strike as
there is often no territory under such non-state actors’ control, Benard and Leaf
cite Article 51 reforms as the legal basis for unilateral action to account for the
probability of an attack measured by an enemy’s capability and intention, as well
as the magnitude of the harm. Id. at 1435.
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imminent armed attack.”37 The guiding criteria are ostensibly
based on the proportionality of the response relative to the threat
posed and the necessity of the response under the circumstances.38
Moreover, it has been argued that the term “inherent” in Article 51
of the Charter39 is not meant to limit the customary right to
anticipatory self-defense; that is, an actual armed attack is not the
only circumstance contemplated by the Charter to allow exercising
the right to self-defense.40
3.2. The Responsibility to Protect
In addition to a nation’s responsibility to defend its citizens, the
community of nations and Great Powers arguably have a
responsibility to protect41 populations suffering from humanitarian
disasters.42 Among the drivers of such collective initiatives, the
37 Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty
Waiver”—Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great
Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 421 (describing the historic
origins of self-defense and its recognition as a justifiable use of force by Catholic
and Ancient Greek philosophers).
38 For a description of the 1847 Caroline case involving Americans on a ship
full of armaments intended for Canadians in their independence struggle against
the British, see id. at 421–22 (citing ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PROCESS AND PROSPECT 33–35 (2d. ed. 1995) (quoting Daniel Webster)). The British
soldiers found the ship and attacked its unarmed Americans, killing two and
capturing two, and sent the ship over Niagara Falls. Specifically, the standard of
“necessity” accepted by both the American and British sides was that there should
be “an ‘instant, overwhelming’ necessity” that leaves “‘no choice of means, and no
moments for deliberation.”
39 See Benard & Leaf, supra note 36, at 1398 (citing U.N. Charter art. 51)
(emphasizing that an important feature of Article 51 is its creation of a unilateral
right permitting the “inherent right” to self-defense without prior U.N. approval).
40 See Kelly, supra note 37, at 421 (2005) (noting that there are circumstances
when a state is not required to wait until it has experienced an actual armed attack
to act in self-defense).
41 See Amit K. Chhabra, Superpower Responsibility for State Recognition:
Charting a Course for Nagorno-Karabakh, 31 B.U. INT’L L. J. 125 (2013) (arguing for a
system favoring state recognition of former Soviet states and the responsibility of
the Great Powers to lead unilaterally in this regard, especially in cases of
humanitarian disaster giving rise to the responsibility to protect).
42 One of the first calls for such a duty appeared in the 2005 World Summit
Outcome:

Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. . . .
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter,
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United Nations has taken a front row seat. Several guiding
principles underlie the United Nations’ mandate in this regard.
First, its stated raison d’être:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace.43
For this reason, regional disputes that appear domestic in
nature garner the United Nations’ support for intervention when
deemed threats to “international peace and security.” Such
authorization comes in the form of an Article 48 Security Council
resolution.44 Examples of authorized interventions include: where
a state commits or fails to prevent genocide or crimes against
humanity in its territory; where countries find it necessary to take
action to protect their nationals against other states that harbor
international terrorists; and where states pursue weapons of mass
destruction (“WMD”).45 Historically, the supposed maintenance of
international peace and security was deemed necessary in the case
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and
national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity . . . .
We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to
helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break
out.
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. A/60/1, (Oct.
24, 2005).
43 U.N. Charter art. 1(1).
44 See id. at art. 48(1) (establishing the powers of the United Nations Security
Council).
45 See Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans,”
Secession, and the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L., 137, 155 (2010)
(enumerating several bases for authorized intervention previously described by
Richard Haas).
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of Albanian Muslims persecuted in Kosovo46 as well as on behalf of
Kurds allegedly persecuted in Northern Iraq.47 Moreover, a
refugee problem was identified as giving rise to this responsibility
in the aftermath of the 2008 Haiti earthquake.48
Additionally, the basic human rights provisions provide
responsibilities of both the United Nations as well as its member
states.
[T]he United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of
living, full employment, and conditions of economic and
social progress and development;. . . and c. universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion.49
This obligation also belongs to each individual state: “All
Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the
purposes set forth in Article 55.”50
3.3. Intervention Limitations
This obligation to act is not without limitation, however. In so
acting, Members shall consider: that “[t]he Organization is based
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members;”51 that
they “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state;”52 that “the United Nations [shall not]
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state;”53 that they “shall give the United Nations
Id. at 156–57.
Id. at 156.
48 See Linda Malone, The Responsibility to Protect Haiti, INSIGHTS (Am. Soc’y
Int’l
Law,
Wash.
D.C.),
Mar.
10,
2010,
available
at
http://www.asil.org/files/insight100310pdf.pdf (pointing to Security Council
intervention in the face of gross human rights violations). Unlike the Kosovo and
Iraqi Kurds cases, in its essence the Haiti situation presented a duty to protect in
the face of an act of God, rather than a man-made humanitarian situation, though
the immediate concern was the subsequent refugee situation that humans
aggravated.
49 U.N. Charter art. 55(a, c).
50 Id. art. 56.
51 Id. art. 2(1).
52 Id. art. 2(4).
53 Id. art. 2(7).
46
47
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every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the
present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any
state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action;”54 and “shall ensure that states which are not
Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these
Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security.”55
Additionally, the 2005 World Summit established a
responsibility to protect.56 The Austrian Initiative followed upon it
by asserting that the rule of law must also apply to
interventionists.57 On this basis, it specifically recommended that
the Security Council “(i) encourage Member States contributing . . .
personnel to take . . . preventative action . . . to hold their nationals
accountable for criminal conduct; (ii) . . . support the SecretaryGeneral’s efforts to seek formal assurances from troop contributing
countries (TCCs) that they will exercise jurisdiction over their
personnel;” and (iii) commit to putting victims of sexual violence
“at the centre of its attention.”58
With these principles and their delineated limitations as
background, this Article reviews whether the United States has
been derelict in its duties where it has chosen to act in self-defense
or to aid populations suffering from humanitarian disasters.
4.

A DERELICTION OF DUTIES?

Although the motives in self-defense and in humanitarian
missions aimed at protecting vulnerable populations appear to be
similarly beneficent, some have argued that humanitarian motives
can be corrupt. Kelly points to an extreme example: “The cover of
humanitarian intervention can be used by somebody like Hitler to
justify moving into the Sudetenland to protect the repressed
Id. art. 2(5).
Id. art. 2(6).
56 See supra note 42. Cf. Kelly, supra note 37 at 399 (discussing INT’L COMM’N
ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001),
available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf, which, among
other things, calls for humanitarian intervention to become an international
obligation).
57 See Simon Chesterman, The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law at i
(Executive Summary, ¶ (iii)) (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 08-57, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279849.
58 See id. at iii (Summary of Recommendations, Recommendation 9).
54
55
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German minority within that part of Czechoslovakia.”59 This
cannot be contended, though, and the capacity for corruption is
intact even in the case of a coalition of powers avowing to take predetermined actions (e.g., the Axis alliance of Germany, Italy, and
Japan). The criteria provided for an intervener to act responsibly,
however, can be instructive in this regard.60
4.1. Obama’s Campaigns in the “Muslim World”
Whether or not we find persuasive the argument to broaden
the circumstances in which a unilateral use of force in self-defense
is justified, international law continues to require an imminent,
armed attack. With these principles as background, we survey
some of the United States’ incursions into the “Muslim World”
during the Arab Spring.
To begin, our terminology of a War on Terror is itself an
obvious misnomer. Though such an appellation might match the
Bush Administration’s attempt to instill in the public mind a
wartime mentality, this is itself irresponsible and misleading.
Additionally, it has been suggested that a traditional “state of
emergency” more accurately comports with legitimate attempts to
target al-Qaeda for its role in the September 11, 2001 attacks. This
approach has the collateral benefit of eliminating the false pretense
of being at war.61
In outlining the American strategy of preventive war, President
Bush pronounced that “[t]o forestall or prevent . . . hostile acts by
our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively.”62
In spite of this bold-faced assertion, as
demonstrated above, this stance runs counter to international
Kelly, supra note 37, at 431.
See Joshi, supra note 27, at 30 (detailing four principal strategic policies of
the United States).
61 See Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L. J. 1871 (2004).
Ackerman contends that, instead of using the misleading rubric of a War on
Terror, President Bush should request a temporary state of emergency so as to
provide more flexibility in dealing with the sources of terrorism that enabled the
attacks on September 11, 2001. In Ackerman’s words: “So long as the general
public accepts the notion that America can make ‘war’ on something as
amorphous as ‘terrorism,’ future presidents will have a much easier time
convincing the nation to engage in old-fashioned wars against sovereign states.”
Id. at 1876.
62 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/63562.pdf.
59
60
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law.63 In turn, as a result of the Bush-era support of religious
parties, an American “democracy-promotion” policy enabled
through the efforts of non-governmental organizations and social
media, and a consistent development of a responsibility to protect
populations suffering from a humanitarian crisis, President Obama
inherited a world in which Iraq had already become a theocracy.64
Conversely, Obama played a role in the Egyptian transition in
power by calling upon Hosni Mubarak to transfer power to the
Egyptian opposition, even though that opposition had a record of
female genital mutilation.65 The transition in power was relatively
peaceful, with Mubarak stepping down after previously refusing
to do so.
In Libya, Obama inherited the Bush-era policies of providing
defense armaments that benefited American defense contractors
and securing lucrative oil and gas deals that benefited American oil
companies.66 In its turn, the Obama Administration supported the
Libyan opposition party, the Libyan Transitional National Council
(“LTNC”); in response to rebel activities, Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi’s regime brutally suppressed the secessionist movement.
These actions were largely considered to be genocidal in nature
and in violation of the Libyan government’s obligation to protect
its own people from torture and crimes against humanity.
Ultimately, the United Nations and NATO were prompted to
intervene in favor of the LTNC. The Security Council issued
Resolution 1973, authorizing members to intervene and
establishing a “no-fly” zone but specifically forbidding a “foreign
63 See U.N. Charter art. 51 (preserving the right of individual or collective
self-defense in the event of armed attack); see also Byman, supra note 26, at 54
(noting that United States intervention in the Arab region may be perceived as an
attempt to “conquer the Middle East,” and that such an interpretation may lend
itself to “anti-U.S. sentiment”). Additionally, the United Nations recently
confirmed the limitation on preemptive self-defense in the absence of collective
action initiated by the Security Council. See A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, Rep. of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
59th sess, ¶¶ 183–198, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
64 See Hannibal Travis, Wargaming the “Arab Spring”: Predicting Likely
Outcomes and Planning U.N. Responses, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript 5-11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2062578 (explaining the multiple factors that enabled political reform
to take root in Arab countries).
65 Id. at 24–25.
66 See id. at 28–29 (noting, for example, the Obama Administration’s approval
of a $60 million sale of fifty refurbished armored troop carriers to Libya, and oil
and gas deals that would yield “billions” for American corporations).
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occupation force.”67 Obama seized upon the opportunity to
intervene but was careful to avoid violating the Security Council
proscription. An advisor to the President explained the rationale
for the nature of U.S. participation:
[T]he President decided . . . we were willing to back a
military action if we could get a coalition together because
we weren’t going to do it unilaterally. We wouldn’t put
U.S. boots on the ground in another Muslim country. We
wanted to get Arab participation[;] not just rhetorical
participation but concrete participation and we did with the
. . . UAE and the Jordanians and we have had a good legal
basis. And we tried to put together a coalition.68
This attempt to forge a genuine coalition force puts the United
States on the right side of international law. Additionally, by
providing only aerial support for the LTNC, the United States
complied with the terms of the Security Council Resolution.
In the case of Syria, evidence of fatalities emanating from
fighting between protesters and President Bashar al-Assad’s
governmental forces led the European Union and the United States
to propose a U.N. resolution blocking arms shipments and
imposing economic sanctions. However, the BRICS states (Brazil,
Russia, India, China, South Africa) opposed this initiative on the
ground that such measures would encourage social unrest and
promote war. Still, the General Assembly condemned Assad’s
violent crackdowns, and the members of the Security Council
condemned the widespread human rights violations.69 The United
States has recognized the Syrian National Council as the legitimate
67 See S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011)
(“Authoriz[ing] Member States . . . to take all necessary measures . . . to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya. . . while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part
of Libyan territory . . . .”). Id. ¶ 6 (“Decid[ing] to establish a ban on all flights in
the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians . . . .”).
68 Travis, supra note 64, at 41 (citing The Charlie Rose Show (Charlie Rose LLC
television broadcast Jan. 26, 2012)).
69 See Syria—Uprising and Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/news/international/countriesandterritories/syria/index.html (last visited
Jan. 18, 2013) (noting that China and Russia impeded the Security Council from
doing more); Rick Gladstone, General Assembly Votes to Condemn Syrian Leader,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/world/
middleeast/secretary-general-ban-ki-moon-castigates-syria-ahead-of-generalassembly-vote.html?hp&_r=0 (the resolution passed with 137 in favor, 12 votes
against, and 17 abstentions).
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government, although of the coalition Council’s leadership
includes the Muslim Brotherhood. Again, the United States has
played its role from a distance, as there has been no outright U.S.
intervention other than through the United Nations; thus, the
question of violating international law does not arise.
By contrast, the United States and the world community have
used no military force against Sudan, whose President, Omar alBashir, has consistently violated human rights. As elsewhere in the
“Muslim World,” student protesters in Sudan began to
demonstrate, but the government quickly crushed them. Although
former U.S. President Jimmy Carter attempted to alleviate the
humanitarian crisis that resulted from the long-lasting civil war
between the North and South, there is hope due to the fact that
South Sudan finally obtained its independence in 2011.
Additionally, the long-standing conflict in the Darfur region has
resulted in 400,000 deaths, 2.7 million internally-displaced persons,
and more than 4.7 million people reliant on humanitarian aid.70
Nonetheless, Bashir has been able to avoid a full-scale Security
Council resolution to intervene militarily; instead, the United
Nations Mission in Sudan aimed to provide humanitarian
assistance until it disbanded last year with recognition of South
Sudan as an independent state. Still, a military intervention was
justifiable as the violence in Darfur alone threatens the
maintenance of international peace and security. President Obama
attempted to pressure Bashir through the imposition of economic
sanctions71 and by ostensibly taking the side of South Sudan in
light of Bashir’s atrocious humanitarian record. Additionally, the
International Criminal Court charged Bashir with war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide.72 Fortunately, Sudan and
South Sudan recently concluded an agreement to resolve the
dispute over payments by South Sudan for use of Sudanese export
infrastructure, hopefully bringing an end to their conflict.73 These
70 What
Has
Happened
in
Darfur?,
SAVEDARFUR,
http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/primer (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
71 Andrew Quinn, U.S. Extends Long-standing Sanctions on Sudan, REUTERS
(Nov. 1, 2011, 6:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/01/us-sudanusa-idUSTRE7A07BD20111101.
72 Marlise Simons, International Court Adds Genocide to Charges Against Sudan
Leader, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/
world/africa/13hague.html?ref=omarhassanalbashir.
73 Katrina Manson & William Wallis, US Seeks $3bn for Sudan Oil Deal,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/48563106/
US_Seeks_3_Billion_for_Sudan_Oil_Deal (reporting that the South Sudan has
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actions on the part of President Obama are laudable; not only has
he avoided unauthorized force, but the United States has also
certainly acted within its right to impose economic sanctions in an
effort to force cooperation with South Sudan.
5.

CONCLUSION

Although most reviews of presidential conduct find flagrant
violations, the United States’ recent actions in the Arab Spring
states under President Obama have been laudable. America is
acting responsibly, consistent with its responsibilities under
international law. Some claim that we are inconsistent in our
rallying for regime change in some oil-producing states, such as
Libya and Iraq, but not in others such as Sudan. This is a valid
critique, but inconsistent foreign policy is not a violation of
international law. Perhaps then it is not a cloak we hide under so
much as a thin veil that we fool only ourselves into believing
preserves our legitimacy. After all, in spite of our efforts to
encourage development in the “Muslim World,” headline-making
protests tend to show that America and Americans arouse disdain
more than awe in this part of the world.
The next and perhaps even more important question is whether
we can expect this pattern of behavior to continue based on what
we know about American foreign policy priorities. Although it is
interesting from an academic perspective to query whether the
current Administration has acted in conformity with international
law, children in Iran are denied the ‘blessings of liberty’ if the next
administration is unwilling to conform with international law and
bombs Tehran because it assumes a subsequent government would
be better able secure American oil interests.
Alexander Benard and Paul Leaf support certain potential
reforms to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter;74 these reforms are
unlikely, however. In fact, a recent review initiated by Kofi Annan
confirmed the existing language and unwillingness of the United
Nations to broaden the bases of unilateral use of force; rather,
anything outside of the limited circumstances requires collective
action by the Security Council.75 By the same token, American
agreed to pay the equivalent of $9.48 per barrel of oil for the use of export
infrastructure in Sudan and to transfer to Sudan an additional $3.028 billion).
74 See supra note 36.
75 See Simon Chesterman, The Outlook for UN Reform 18 (N. Y. Univ. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 295, 2011), available at
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policies are grounded in historical precedent that define the
nation’s character and psyche; thus, it is unlikely that America will
depart from its current regional policies. Rather, we can expect to
violate international law if we are more interested than the other
permanent members of the Security Council in taking a specific
action; if the other members agree, however, we will readily march
to the same beat.

http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1297&context=nyu_plltwp
(“[T]he risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it
continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventative
action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted.”) (quoting A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supra note 63, ¶ 191).
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